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THE IMPACT OF RETIREMENT 
POLICIES ON EMPLOYMENT AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT* 
by 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
Professor of Economics and Labor Economics 
Cornell University 
Social policies aimed at the labor market, both those arrived at through 
the legislative process or those determined through collective bargaining in 
the private sector, tend to be piecemeal in nature and to evolve over time. 
Legislation is adopted at one point in time and typically is amended many 
times thereafter.1 All the while, the economic environment that the legisla-
tion was designed to influence may be changing, and policies which were 
desirable when first adopted may prove ineffective or costly to society at later 
dates.2 
Practically every piece of labor market legislation or social program has 
undesirable side effects, which often were not anticipated at the time of adop-
tion. These may conflict either with the goal of the program or the goals of 
other social programs. For example, it is by now well-established that in-
creases in the minimum wage, if complied with, not only will increase the 
wages of low-wage workers, but will also reduce their employment oppor-
tunities.3 To take another example, the Davis-Bacon Act and other "prevail-
ing wage" legislation require that construction workers on Federally funded, 
financed, or assisted (through loan guarantees) construction projects be paid 
the "prevailing wages" in an area.4 Typically this is taken to be the union 
wage scales and low-wage nonunion contractors effectively are precluded 
from bidding on these projects. Regardless of the current merits of prevailing 
wage legislation, it is clear that an unintended consequence of them is an in-
crease in the construction costs of hospitals and public housing programs. 
This results in an increase in the costs of providing these services to con-
sumers. Indeed, to the extent that high construction costs increase the 
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monthly rental of public housing units above the levels which low-income 
families can afford, projects may be foregone and the level of employment in 
construction lowered. 
SCOPE OF PAPER 
Previous papers at this conference have suggested that aggregate 
demand policies alone will not be sufficient to move the economy to full em-
ployment with a nonaccelerating rate of inflation and have stressed that 
policies which alter the structure of labor markets are required. To illustrate 
how public policies may affect the structure of labor markets, my paper 
evaluates the influence of current public and private retirement policies on 
the level and distribution of employment and unemployment. The focus is 
on the Social Security System (OASDHI), the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), the amendment to the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act that raises the permissable mandatory retirement age to 70, 
and early retirement provisions negotiated in private collective bargaining 
agreements. Certainly, it would be difficult to criticize the intent of these 
policies which either provide for (or guarantee) retirement benefits, or allow 
older workers the freedom to extend their work lives. However, each of the 
public policies will be seen to have an adverse effect on the level of employ-
ment. As such, my paper also illustrates the more general point that because 
of the piecemeal nature of public policy, policies designed to promote one 
goal may well detract from achieving other goals. 
In what follows, I sketch the ways in which the various retirement 
policies influence the level and distribution of employment and unemploy-
ment. Since my discussion of the Social Security system is relatively long, I 
treat the other subjects only briefly. I make no great claims to originality here; 
in the main I merely summarize the ideas of others. Moreover, the discus-
sion relates primarily to the qualitative impacts of the policies on employ-
ment and unemployment; only limited evidence on their quantitative 
impacts is presented. 
At the onset, I should stress that it would be incorrect for the reader to 
conclude that because I discuss the undesirable side effects of several public 
programs in this paper, that I oppose the programs or believe on balance that 
they have been negative factors in the economy.5 Nothing could be further 
from the truth! Rather, my objective is to suggest that we need to find ways to 
marginally modify the programs so as to both preserve their benefits to 
society andio reduce their negative impacts on the level of employment. My 
concluding remarks give some examples of such modifications. 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 
The Social Security system influences labor markets in a variety of wayV 
that are related to the manner in which eligibility for and receipt of benefits 
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occurs, to the method of financing, and to the extent to which the retirement 
trust fund is funded. I first will sketch some of the important parameters of 
each aspect of the system and then discuss the labor market effects they pro-
duce. 
For an unmarried male or female who retires at age 65, the level of bene-
fits that the individual is eligible to receive is based upon his or her career 
average earnings in covered employment.6 Women, and since 1961 also men, 
are eligible for reduced benefits at age 62, at a rate that is reduced less than an 
actuarially fair amount. A worker with a dependent spouse, or dependent chil-
dren or grandchildren, is eligible to receive an additional 50 percent of his (or 
her) normal retirement benefit amount. The spouse may receive benefits 
based upon her (or his) previous work, but if this is done, the dependents' al-
lowance is lost. Upon the death of the retiree, the surviving widow or 
widower, if over age 65, can elect to continue to receive the retiree's normal 
benefit amount and will typically do so // it exceeds the level of benefits 
which the survivor is eligible for as a result of her or his lifetime work in 
covered employment. 
Given one's eligibility for a specific level of benefits, the level of benefits 
actually received is a function of one's retirement earnings. As of 1978, the 
first $4,000 of a retiree's labor earnings are disregarded in the calculation of 
the retiree's benefits. After this earnings disregard, the retiree faces an 
implicit marginal tax rate of 50 percent, as retirement benefits are reduced by 
one dollar for each additional two dollars that the retiree earns. For individ-
uals older than 72, there is no earnings test for receipt of benefits. 
Social Security retirement, disability and health benefits are financed by 
a payroll tax on both employers and employees on all covered earnings up 
until a maximum taxable earnings level. In 1978, the OASDHI combined tax 
rate nominally paid by both employers and employees was 6.05 percent of an 
employee's earnings, up to an earnings level of $17,700. No taxes are paid by 
an employee on annual earnings over this level.7 Although there is a small 
trust fund, the Social Security system is an unfunded pay-as-you-go system.8 
Rather than the contributions made by employers and employees accumulat-
ing in an "individual account" for an employee over his work-life to be used 
to fund his annuity at retirement, contributions made by employers and em-
ployees today are used to finance the retirement benefits of current retirees. 
These characteristics of the Social Security system interact to influence 
labor markets in a number of ways. First, the retirement earnings test for 
receipt of benefits discourages labor force participation and employment of 
the aged. Whether this discouragement effect has increased or decreased 
over time is an open question. On the one hand, since 1965 retirement bene-
fits as a percentage of earnings in the year before retirement have increased 
substantially (Table 1). For example, a single male retiring at age 65 who had 
always been employed at the minimum wage would have received 37 percent 
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TABLE 1 
Social Security Benefits as a Percentage of Earnings 
in Year Before Retirement for a Single Male Worker Retiring at Age 65 
Retirement Minimum Retail Service 
Date Wage3 Trade" Industry3 Manufacturing3 Construction3 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
37 
36 
35 
38 
43 
46 
45 
53 
51 
55 
58 
35 
35 
34 
37 
40 
43 
42 
48 
47 
49 
51 
31 
30 
29 
31 
34 
36 
34 
39 
38 
40 
41 
28 
27 
27 
29 
32 
35 
34 
38 
37 
39 
40 
22 
21 
21 
22 
24 
25 
23 
27 
26 
29 
31 
"Based upon estimate of average annual earnings in the industry. 
Source: Alicia Munnell [29]. 
of his final salary upon retirement in 1965. By 1976, his benefits would have 
risen to 58 percent. On the other hand, the earnings disregard has been 
liberalized, rising from $1,500 in 1966 to $4,000 in 1978. Furthermore, since 
1973, the implicit marginal tax rate on earnings above the earnings disregard 
has been reduced from 100 to 50 percent.9 Although these latter changes 
have decreased the incentives of older Americans to reduce their labor force 
participation, one can formally show that the net effect of the Social Security 
benefits payments, the earnings disregard, and the marginal tax rate is to 
induce older Americans to work less than they would in the absence of the 
Social Security system.10 Of course, since the OASI portion of the system was 
intended to be a retirement system, this should not be considered an undesira-
ble outcome. 
The second set of influences of the system on labor markets operates via 
the share of the payroll tax nominally paid by employers. To the extent that 
employers cannot shift 100 percent of the burden of this tax on to employees 
in the form of lower wages (or lower wage increases), this share of the tax is 
likely to affect firms' employment decisions in a number of ways. Although 
evidence on the extent of shifting is mixed, two recent studies have con-
cluded that less than 50 percent of employers1 share of the payroll tax is 
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shifted onto labor.11,As a result, firms' labor costs are increased by the tax, 
inducing them to reduce employment and adopt more capital intensive 
means of production. 
Furthermore, the existence of a maximum taxable earnings level, with a 
flat rate payroll tax rate up until that point, suggests that payroll tax rate in-
creases will increase the cost of low-wage employees (with annual earnings 
less than the maximum taxable earnings level) relative to the costs of high 
wage employees. If relative wages do not fully adjust to compensate for this 
change, increases in the tax rate should lead firms to substitute high wage for 
low wage employees, thereby shifting the burden of unemployment to less 
skilled workers. In contrast, increases in the taxable earnings level reduce the 
incentives for such substitution.12 
Between 1960 and 1978, the OASDHI tax rate has more than doubled, 
rising from 3.0 to 6.05 percent. During the same period the maximum tax-
able earnings level rose from $4,800 to $17,700. As a result of the latter 
change, between 1960 and 1975 taxable earnings as a fraction of total covered 
earnings rose from .781 to .845 and the fraction of total covered employees 
with earnings at or above the maximum taxable earnings level fell from .280 
to .151 (Table 2). Given the large increases in the maximum taxable earnings 
levels since 1975, it is likely that the effect of the change in the taxable earn-
ings level has dominated the effect of the increase in the tax rate, causing a 
reduction in employers' incentives to substitute high-wage for low-wage 
employees. 
The existence of a maximum taxable earnings level also provides an 
incentive for employers to reduce labor turnover.13 To see this, consider the 
following simple example. Suppose, as was true in 1960, that the OASDHI 
tax rate was 3.0 percent and the maximum taxable earnings level was $4,800. 
If there was no labor turnover and all of a firm's employees were paid a 
monthly salary of $800, the firm's payroll tax liability per full-time employee-
position would be $144 ($4,800 x .03). In contrast, if an employee quit after 
six months and was replaced by another equally paid worker, the payroll tax 
liability for that "employee-position" would be $288 ($4,800 x .03 x 2). 
Clearly employers can reduce their payroll tax liabilities by reducing labor 
turnover. 
More formally, one can show that as long as the taxable earnings level is 
less than an employee's annual earnings, the Social Security tax provides an 
added incentive for the firm to take actions to reduce the probability that the 
employee will voluntarily quit his job. Moreover, one can also show that the 
marginal cost of labor turnover schedule is a nonlinear function of the tax-
able earnings level and reaches a maximum when the taxable earnings level 
is set equal to Vi average annual earnings.14 Thus, if the taxable earnings level 
is greater than (less than) V2 average annual earnings, increases in the taxable 
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earnings level will increase (decrease) the level of. labor turnover. Recent 
empirical evidence indicates that, other things equal, such a relationship does 
exist between firms' quit rates and taxable earnings levels under the 
unemployment insurance system. 
During the last ten years, the fraction of total covered employees with 
earnings at or above the OASDHI maximum taxable earnings level has fallen 
(Table 2), while the ratio of OASDHI maximum taxable earnings to average 
TABLE 2 
Taxable Earnings and Total Earnings 
For Employees Covered by OASDHI 
Year 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
Source: U.S 
OASDHI 
Tax 
Rate 
3.0 
3.0 
3.125 
3.625 
3.625 
3.625 
4.2 
4.4 
4.4 
4.8 
4.8 
5.2 
5.2 
5.85 
5.85 
5.85 
5.85 
5.85 
6.05 
Maximum 
Taxable 
Earnings 
4800 
4800 
4800 
4800 
4800 
4800 
6600 
6600 
7800 
7800 
7800 
7800 
9000 
10800 
13200 
14100 
15300 
16500 
17700 
Fraction of 
Total Covered 
Employees With 
Earnings at or 
Above Maximum 
Taxable Earnings 
.280 
.292 
.310 
.325 
.345 
.361 
.242 
.263 
.212 
.245 
.260 
.282 
.250 
.204 
.151 
.151 
* 
* 
* 
Taxable Earnings 
as a Fraction of 
Total Earnings 
in Covered 
Employment 
.763 
.774 
.758 
.746 
.728 
.713 
.800 
.781 
.817 
.801 
.782 
.763 
.783 
.817 
.851 
.845 
* 
* 
* 
. Social Security Administration, Social Security Bulletin, Septemb 
1977, Table Q2, and E. Cowan, "Carter Signs Social Security Tax Rise for 
110 Million," New York Times, December 21, 1977, p. 51. 
*Data not available yet. 
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annual earnings has increased for all major industry groups (Table 3). If the 
relationship between turnover and taxable earnings levels also does exist for 
the Social Security payroll tax, the former change should lead to a reduction in 
firms' quit rates while the latter should lead to an increase.*5 Hence, the net 
effect of these changes is ambiguous. Since the unemployment rate is 
intimately related to labor turnover, future empirical estimation of these 
relationships is warranted. 
The third set of effects of the system on labor markets operates via the 
share of the payroll tax nominally paid by employees and the share implicitly 
paid by them in the form of lower wages. This share of the payroll tax has a 
differential impact on different classes of individuals. For individuals not in 
the labor force but contemplating entering it, the payroll tax has a pure 
substitution effect, reducing the net current return to employment and dis-
couraging labor force participation. For employed individuals earning more 
than the taxable earnings level, the payroll tax has a pure income effect, 
stimulating increased work effort as total earnings, but not the reward to 
marginal work effort, are reduced. For employed individuals earning less 
than the taxable wage base, both income and substitution effects are present, 
and the net impact on work effort is ambiguous. 
The large increases in the Social Security tax rate and taxable earnings 
levels during the past decade, in themselves, probably marginally retarded 
the growth of labor force participation and marginally reduced the work effort 
of those individuals who earned more than the taxable earnings level prior to 
its increase, but less after its increase. Although the impact of these changes 
on the unemployment rate is ambiguous, their net effect was probably to 
marginally reduce the growth rate of employment. 
This effect may have been partially offset by the accompanying 
liberalization of promised future benefits (Table 1). Since eligibility for these 
benefits to some extent depends upon career work effort, promised higher 
future benefit levels may stimulate greater work effort on the part of non-
aged workers. This entitlement effect is likely to be greatest for low-wage 
workers as the benefit/earnings ratio declines as earnings rise.16 As noted ear-
lier, however, married females have the option of receiving either their own 
OASI benefits or 50 percent (100 percent) of their husband's benefits while 
he is alive (after he dies). To the extent that a husband's earnings considera-
bly exceed his wife's, the net additional OASI benefits which her lifetime 
work effort entitles her to is likely to be small or zero. Hence, the entitlement 
effect is less likely to be important for married women and the system unam-
biguously provides an incentive for them not to work.17 
The final effect of the Social Security system on the level of employment 
operates through its influence on the level of private savings.18 Recent 
econometric evidence indicates that the Social Security system substantially 
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TABLE 3 
Private 
Ratio of OASDHI Maximum Taxable Earnings, 
to Average Annual Earnings, by Industry 
Transportation, 
Contract Communications 
Year Nonagriculture Mining Construction Manuf. Public Utility 
.990 
.962 
1.163 
1.157 
1.142 
1.144 
1966 
1970 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1.283 
1.256 
1.644 
1.656 
1.669 
1.677 
.974 
.912 
1.149 
1.087 
1.071 
1.047 
.868 
.767 
1.019 
1.021 
1.033 
1.073 
1.126 
1.122 
1.439 
1.431 
1.416 
1.399 
Wholesale 
and 
letail Trade 
1.605 
1.570 
2.145 
2.141 
2.127 
2.227 
Finance, 
Insurance & 
Real Estate 
1.379 
1.323 
1.812 
1.799 
1.845 
1.883 
Services 
1.650 
1.552 
1.992 
1.976 
2.016 
2.016 
Source: Average weekly earnings of nonsupervisory workers from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings 
(January 1978) and Bulletin 1312-10, Employment and Earnings for the United States, 1909-1975. Average weekly earn-
ings are multiplied by 52 and then divided by the maximum taxable earnings to get the number in the table. 
reduces private savings.19 This occurs because workers consider their 
OASDHI contributions and promised retirement benefits as a form of sav-
ings, and reduce other savings accordingly. Apparently this effect is larger 
than the stimulative impact of the system on savings that occurs because the 
system encourages early retirement. Early retirement, other things equal, 
would require an individual to increase his savings per year over a shorter 
period of employment to provide for a longer period of retirement. 
The net reduction in private savings is not offset by an increase in public 
savings because of the pay-as-you-go nature of the Social Security system. As 
a result, the level of total savings and capital accumulation in the economy is 
reduced. Reduced capital investment translates into reduced growth in pro-
ductivity and output and ultimately into reduced rates of growth of employ-
ment and/or real wages. Recent increases in Social Security taxes and prom-
ised future retirement benefits have likely exacerbated this effect. 
In sum, the parameters of the Social Security system interact to produce 
numerous effects on the levels and distribution of employment and un-
employment in the economy. The reduction in labor force participation and 
employment induced by the structure of benefits is a planned effect of the 
retirement system and should not be judged a negative feature. In contrast, 
the OASDHI payroll tax on employers and employees and the nonfunded 
nature of the retirement trust fund probably serve to reduce both the labor 
force participation rates and employment levels of non-aged individuals. In 
addition, the parameters of the system were shown to differentially influence 
the distribution of employment and unemployment across sex classes and 
earnings classes of employees. Recent changes in the system's parameters 
probably have marginally reduced the growth rate in employment and also 
reduced employers' incentives to substitute high-skilled for low-skilled 
labor.20 I view the latter as a socially desirable change. 
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 
In 1974, Congress passed a major piece of private sector pension reform 
legislation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). ERISA was 
designed to increase the probability that private sector employees receive 
promised retirement benefits and included provisions requiring liberalized 
vesting rules, more stringent funding requirements, and increased fiduciary 
responsibility. The need for, and wisdom of ERISA-type controls over public 
employees' retirement systems is currently under debate. 
No one can challenge the social desirability of guaranteeing that workers 
will receive promised retirement benefits. However, as with many govern-
ment regulations, pension reform legislation has unintended side effects.21 
Because ERISA-type controls increase employers' costs of providing pen-
sions, one would expect to observe employers shifting at least part of the 
increased costs to employees in the form of lower wages or lower wage in-
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creases. If this occurs, it is not obvious that such legislation will be unam-
biguously beneficial to workers. Rather, the desirability will depend partially 
on the rate at which employees are willing to trade off current for future 
income. Although it is too early to assess ERISA's impact on wages, several 
recent studies have shown that a trade-off exists between wages, retirement 
system characteristics, and employees' pension contributions in both the pri-
vate and public sectors.22 
To the extent that employers can not fully shift ERISA's costs on to em-
ployees, either through lower wages or through termination of the pension 
plans, costs per unit of labor will increase. In this case, one unintended side 
effect of ERISA would be a reduction in the level (or rate of growth) of pri-
vate employment. This reduction would not be uniform across all employers, 
but would be concentrated in those firms with pension plans whose pre-
ERISA provisions did not meet the ERISA standards. Since the demand for 
public employees is negatively related to their costs, adoption of ERISA-type 
controls over public employees' retirement systems would have a similar 
negative impact on employment or employment growth in the public sector.23 
ERISA-type controls also affect the level of pension plan funding and 
composition of pension funds' portfolios. On the one hand, by requiring pen-
sion plans to be fully funded, ERISA will increase the stock of current 
pension fund assets. To the extent that this is not offset by a decline in indi-
viduals' saving, this will increase the level of capital accumulation in the 
economy and ultimately the level of employment. On the other hand, by 
restricting the type of investments which pension funds may make, ERISA 
may prevent pension fund assets from being invested in projects with the 
highest expected rate of return (but also highest risk) and hence may reduce 
the rate of productivity growth. Without empirical evidence, one can not 
ascertain which of these effects is likely to dominate. 
MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
Congress has recently approved legislation that, subject to a few excep-
tions, raises from 65 to 70 the age which employers may compel their em-
ployees to retire. This amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act was passed virtually unanimously and will clearly benefit those older 
Americans who wish to continue working at their current jobs. However, the 
legislation may potentially influence the level and distribution of employ-
ment in a number of ways. 
Before discussing these effects, several points should be noted. First, 
mandatory retirement provisions do not force individuals to cease working, 
as such provisions are not universal. Rather they terminate employment with 
the existing employer at the existing contract terms.24 Employees subject to 
such provisions can seek alternative employment and in some cases, on an 
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individual basis, may "recontract" with their employers and remain em-
ployed in the same, or different, position.25 Second, unless the Social Security 
retirement earnings test rules are relaxed, the extension of permissible man-
datory retirement ages still leaves a strong financial inventive for older 
Americans to retire at age 65. Third, mandatory retirement provisions tend 
to be found in large establishments which are unionized and where em-
ployees tend to have long job tenure.26 It is these latter associations that pro-
vide the rationale for the existence of mandatory retirement rules which I 
now discuss.27 
Consider a firm in which an implicit long-term contract exists between 
the firm and its employees. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between earn-
ings and productivity for a "typical" worker over his career with the firm. 
During the early years (t0 to t,) the worker undergoes formal or informal 
training, some of which is specific to the firm, and is typically paid in excess 
of his marginal productivity to induce him to undergo training. The firm 
recoups this by paying the worker less than his marginal productivity during 
the worker's peak productivity years. After some age, which varies widely 
across individuals and depends upon such factors as the employee's health 
and occupation, productivity starts to decline and eventually falls below the 
worker's wage.28 Since informal rules or union contracts prevent wages from 
being cut, after that point (t2) the firm is losing money on the employee, as 
Figure 1 Life-Cycle Earnings and Productivity Profiles 
Earnings (W) 
Marginal 
Productivity (P) 
Experience 
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his wage again exceeds his marginal productivity. Eventually, a point is 
reached (t3) at which the present value of the excess of wages over marginal 
productivities in the first (t0 to t,) and third (t2 to t3) periods just equals the 
present value of the excess of marginal productivities over wages in the sec-
ond period (tj to t2). It is at this point (t3) that the mandatory retirement age 
is established. 
If we assume that some individuals actually postpone their retirement, 
the employment effects of a legislated change in the mandatory retirement 
age can be easily illustrated.29 On average, the present value of wages will 
now exceed the present value of marginal productivities over workers' 
careers and firms will no longer be maximizing their present value of profits. 
One possible reaction of firms is to attempt to adjust wages to restore the 
equality, either by negotiating flatter or everywhere lower real wage profiles. 
If this occurs, the law would have no effect on the overall level of employ-
ment and would redistribute earnings over workers' life-cycles. However, be-
cause the average employee would have a longer worklife, new hires would 
be reduced. Thus, the law would redistribute some jobs from new hires, pri-
marily youths, to the aged.30 If, however, employers could not make adjust-
ments on the age dimension, they would face incentives to reduce their stock 
of employees. The simultaneous reduction in employment levels and 
lengthening of durations of employment would lead to a larger reduction in 
new hires than in the previous case. 
The increase in the retirement age may also discourage employers from 
hiring middle-age employees. To see this, note that prior to the legislated 
change a firm would be willing to hire middle-aged workers provided that the 
surplus (excess of marginal productivity over wages) that the firm could earn 
from the workers' initial years of employment would exceed or equal the 
deficit (excess of wages over marginal productivity) the firm would incur 
from the workers' later years of employment. In terms of Figure 1, with a 
mandatory retirement age of t3, employers would be willing to hire workers 
up until age t4. However, increases in the mandatory retirement age would 
discourage employment of this age workers since the firm would have no 
guarantee that they will retire at t3 (their expected surplus in less than their 
expected deficit). Hence, employers would have incentives to reduce their 
hiring of middle-age workers. In the example, this would be reflected by a 
reduction in the maximum age at which they will hire new employees to an 
age below t4. 
In fact, this effect provides employers an added incentive to prefer 
young rather than middle-age new hires and thus partially offsets the nega-
tive impact on youth employment noted above. It is ironic that opponents of 
the change in the mandatory retirement age focused on its potential impact 
on youth employment because its major impact may well be on middle-aged 
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employment. Indeed, this probably explains why an increase in the legally 
permissible mandatory retirement age was favored by 51 percent of people 
over 65 and 68 percent of youths aged 18 to 29, but opposedby 52 percent of 
people aged 45 to 64 in a recent poll.31 
The final effect of lengthening the mandatory retirement age on employ-
ment is likely to be felt in periods of declining demand. To the extent that the 
legislation reduces the number of retirees per year, employers may be forced 
to resort to layoffs to achieve their desired lower employment levels. This 
would cause a further redistribution of employment away from those with 
the least seniority and would increase the measured unemployment rate. 
Of course, the magnitudes of all of these effects depend upon the num-
ber of employees who actually will postpone their retirement dates in re-
sponse to the legislation. Growth in real incomes, private pensions, and 
Social Security benefits have reduced labor force participation rates of older 
males and reduced the average age at retirement. As long as the Social 
Security retirement earnings test rules are maintained, workers aged 65 face a 
substantial incentive to retire. One would suspect that although the legislated 
change in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act may marginally alter 
the distribution of employment and unemployment across age groups, its 
overall effect on the level of employment is not likely to be large. 
EARLY RETIREMENT 
The final retirement policy to be discussed is early retirement provi-
sions, which are contained in many privately negotiated contracts. Typically, 
these allow early retirement at reduced benefits at a rate that is reduced less 
than or equal to an actuarially fair amount. In some cases, provisions calling 
for bonuses for people who elect early retirement in periods when product 
demand is low are also present. 
Although provisions for early retirement in themselves are beneficial for 
employees, an added attraction to employers is their effect of redistributing 
employment losses across age groups of employees during periods of low or 
declining demand. This may well reduce employers' costs of reducing em-
ployment levels. Union contracts typically require that layoffs be based on 
seniority, with the least senior workers laid off first. However, there may be 
substantial costs to employers of pursuing such policies. The short-run costs 
of laying off the least experienced employees (those employed less than tt 
years in Figure 1) may not seem to be high, but if these workers then find 
employment elsewhere, firms lose the surplus they would obtain in later 
periods from employing them. In addition, due to the experience-rated nature 
of the unemployment insurance payroll rax, after some point increased 
layoffs imply that firms must pay a higher payroll tax. 
Clearly it would be in employers' best interests if employment reduc-
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tions could be concentrated among the most senior workers (those with ex-
perience levels greater than t2 in Figure 1), since firms earn no surplus from 
employing them. Furthermore, if employers can convince these employees 
to voluntarily leave their jobs, in most states the employees will not be eligi-
ble for unemployment insurance benefits and the employers' unemployment 
insurance payroll tax rates will not increase. While most union contracts call 
for layoffs to be inversely related to experience, unions should not object to 
early retirement options which allow senior employees to voluntarily retire 
early. 
Early retirement provisions thus allow employers to redistribute em-
ployment losses in periods of low or declining demand from younger to older 
workers and to reduce their UI payroll tax contributions. They also serve to 
reduce the measured unemployment rate since retirees tend not be labor 
force participants. Indeed, a recent econometric study indicated that retire-
ment rates tend to be higher in unionized firms, where early retirement 
provisions are prevalent, than in nonunion firms.32 Hence, these policies 
probably do reduce the measured employment rate. It is somewhat ironic, 
but perhaps quite telling, that of the four sets of retirement policies which I 
have discussed, only the policy which derives from private sector collective 
bargaining negotiations unambiguously has a non-negative effect on employ-
ment and unemployment. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has focused on the impact of retirement policies on the level 
and distribution of employment and unemployment. All of the policies dis-
cussed, except for early retirement provisions in privately negotiated collec-
tive bargaining contracts were seen to have adverse effects on the level and 
distribution of employment. Hence, the paper illustrates the more general 
point that policies designed to promote one social goal may well detract from 
achieving other goals and suggests that more explicit attention should be 
given to the employment effects of social programs and legislation prior to 
their adoption. 
Undoubtedly the effects I have discussed are only marginal. Moreover, 
one might respond that the government can compensate for the negative em-
ployment effects of such policies through appropriate aggregate demand 
policy. Unfortunately, such a response ignores the unfavorable trade-off be-
tween inflation and unemployment that we face. Most economists now agree 
that to reach full employment without accelerating inflation will require us to 
undertake many separate "structural" policies, which each may only margin-
ally improve the trade-off, but which as a group will have a substantive 
impact on employment and unemployment. Certainly, consideration should 
be given to restructuring retirement policies, so as to reduce their negative 
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impacts on employment and unemployment, in a manner that will not con-
flict with the program's intended purposes. 
Three examples of possible changes in the financing of the social 
security system should suffice to illustrate the types of restructuring one 
might consider. First, the use of general revenue financing from personal 
income tax and corporate tax revenues, rather than payroll tax financing, for 
future system revenue needs would reduce employers' incentives to 
substitute capital for labor.33 Second, one might consider increasing system 
revenues by more than is necessary, to fund benefits in the short run, to 
build up a larger Social Security trust fund. If this fund were then used to buy 
outstanding government debt, the social rate of savings and capital accumu-
lation would increase.34 As noted earlier, increased capital accumulation 
ultimately results in increased rates of growth of employment. Third, raising 
the maximum taxable earnings level, rather than the payroll tax rate, to meet 
future system revenue needs would reduce employers' incentives to substi-
tute high wage for low wage workers. To the extent that the overall rate of 
wage inflation is influenced more by the level of excess demand for labor in 
high wage labor markets than the level of excess demand in low wage labor 
markets, this change will also reduce the unemployment rate associated with 
each level of inflation.35 
ENDNOTES 
*I am grateful to Hirschell Kasper of Oberlin College, Carol Taylor of the Uni-
versity of Arizona, and Sidney Cohen of the International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers for their comments on an earlier version of the paper. Sup-
port for a portion of my research was provided by NSF Grant No. SOC 77-15800. 
1. For example, since the passage of the original Social Security Act in 1935, the 
Act has been amended at least 13 times to extend the categories of covered employ-
ment. See Alicia Munnell [29], Table A-l. 
2. "Protective" labor legislation which limit females' hours of work or occupa-
tional choice are a prime example of this. Designed initially to "protect" the welfare 
of women, they are now seen to be sexist in nature and to interfere with females' 
freedom of choice. 
3. Evidence on compliance with the minimum wage is presented by Orley 
Ashenfelter and Robert S. Smith [3]. Evidence on the disemployment effects of the 
minimum wage is discussed by Edward Gramlich [21]. 
4. See John Gould [20]. 
5. Sidney Cohen's comments on the version of my paper presented at the con-
ference indicated that he incorrectly perceived that version as being both anti-social 
security and, more generally, anti-labor. His remarks have taught me that it is impor-
tant for academics to explicitly state their beliefs when addressing the "real world" to 
avoid such misinterpretation. I have tried to do so above. 
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6. Extensions of coverage throughout the years have left federal, and some 
state and local government employees as the only major groups currently not covered 
by the system. 
7. If an employee works for more than one employer in a year, each employer 
is liable for the payroll tax up until the taxable earnings level is reached in his em-
ployment. The employee's liability is based upon his total earnings from all employ-
ers. 
8. The system currently has unfunded liabilities of more than $4 trillion, and 
the trust fund contains less than a year's worth of benefits for current recipients; see 
Feldstein [19]. 
9. Michael Boskin [5] presents econometric evidence which purports to show 
that a reduction in the Social Security implicit marginal tax rate from one-half to one-
third would reduce the annual probability of retirement for married white males aged 
61 to 65 by almost 60 percent. 
10. Sid Cohen objected at the conference to my use of the word "induce" rather 
than the word "permit" above. I must apologize for being a prisoner of academic 
jargon and stress that my choice of words here implied no normative judgment about 
the desirability of this effect. 
11. The recent studies are Ronald Ehrenberg, Robert Hutchens, and Robert 
Smith [14], and Daniel Hamermesh [23]. The earlier studies include John Brittain 
[9] and Wayne Vroman [36 and 37]. 
12. John Pencavel [30], among others, has made this point. 
13. See Frank Brechling [6 and 7]. 
14. See Frank Brechling and Christopher Jehns [8]. To see this intuitively, con-
sider the following example. Suppose, as above, that the tax rate is 3% and each full-
time employee earns $800/month ($9,600/year). I have listed in Appendix Table 1 
what an employer's OASDHI annual payroll tax per position would be for various 
taxable earnings levels and (a) a situation of no quits, (b) a situation in which each 
employee quit on June 30 and was replaced by another equally paid worker. The dif-
ference between the tax in (a) and (b) is the employer's reduction in payroll tax 
liabilities from eliminating labor turnover. As can be seen in Appendix Table 1 this is 
maximized when the taxable earnings level is equal to Vi the employee's annual earn-
ings. Thus, the employer's incentive to reduce turnover is greatest at that point. 
15. This assumes that the majority of employees earn more than xli the taxable 
wage base. 
16. Currently we have no evidence on the magnitude of the Social Security 
entitlement effect. However, Daniel Hamermesh [24] has presented estimates of the 
entitlement effect induced by the unemployment insurance system. 
17. The argument is analogous for married males whose wives' earnings con-
siderably exceed their own. 
18. For details of this argument, see Martin Feldstein [17 and 19] and Alicia 
Munnell [29], Ch. 6. 
19. See Martin Feldstein [15, 16 and 18] and Alicia Munnell [28]. The estimates 
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of the system's effect .on personal savings varies considerably across these studies, 
however. For example, Feldstein [15] estimates an effect of $51.2 billion in 1969, 
while Munnell estimates one of $3.6 billion in the same year. 
20. My discussion of the Social Security system's effects on employment and 
unemployment has been restricted to its retirement system aspects. However, in 
October of 1977 there were 2.8 million disabled workers under age 65 receiving dis-
ability benefits from the system (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
[34]. If this number seems large to the reader, it may well be because there are sub-
stantial work disincentives built into the Social Security disability insurance program. 
On this, see Van de Water [35]. 
21. That ERISA itself had many "unintended" side effects is now widely recog-
nized and studies of the Act's quantitative impact on a variety of areas, including 
administrative costs, nonadministrative costs, plan terminations, and collective 
bargaining, are currently being conducted under Labor Department funding. Dallis 
Salisbury [31] summarizes the studies being conducted. 
22. See Ronald Ehrenberg [13], Alan Gustman and Martin Segal [22] and Ran-
dall Weiss and Bradley Schiller [39]. 
23. Ronald Ehrenberg [11 and 12] and Orley Ashenfelter and Ronald Ehren-
berg [2] present estimates of the wage elasticity of demand for public employees. 
24. A recent survey indicated that less than 50 percent of all males ages 45-59 
were employed in firms with mandatory retirement rules. See James Schulz [32] and 
also Fred Slavick [33]. 
25. See Frank Dickinson's conference comments for an example of one 
Arizona company's policy in this area. 
26. See Slavick [33] and Edward Lazaer [26]. 
27. The argument presented below is only one of several which have been 
recently offered by Edward Lazaer for why mandatory retirement provisions should 
exist. My attempt to simplify his argument may not capture all of its essential fea-
tures. 
28. This age may be well past 65 for some individuals. The analysis in the text 
focuses on a "representative" or "average" worker. Clearly employers have incen-
tives to allow those employees who they can identify as being highly productive (rela-
tive to their wages) to remain with the firm after the mandatory retirement age. 
29. Estimates of the legislation's potential impact vary and are not always based 
on hard evidence. The U.S. Department of Labor [38] estimated that some 200,000 
aged employees would be added to the workforce in the first year after its passage, 
with smaller numbers added annually thereafter. 
30. Some proponents of the legislation argue that there would be no impact on 
youth employment because the aged and youths do not perform the same jobs and 
are not substitutes. However, this line of reasoning misses the point entirely. The 
reduction in youth employment would occur because of a reduction in new hires per 
se, not because the new hires would have filled the same jobs as the older workers. 
31. See New York Times [1]. 
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32. See Medoff [27], who also cites statistics from Evan Hodgens [25] to back 
up the contention that early retirement provisions and bonuses tends to be found pri-
marily in union contracts. 
33. This would not necessarily reduce the system's effects on labor supply. 
34. See Martin Feldstein [19] for details of this argument. 
35. See Martin N. Bailey and James Tobin [4]. 
REFERENCES 
1. "Americans in Poll Back Ban on Mandatory Retirement Before Age of 70," 
New York Times, November 4, 1977, p. 10. 
2. Ashenfelter, Orley and Ronald Ehrenberg, "The Demand for Labor in the 
Public Sector" in Daniel Hamermesh, ed., Labor in the Public and Non-Profit 
Sectors (Princeton University Press, 1975). 
3. Ashenfelter, Orley and Robert S. Smith, "Compliance With the Minimum 
Wage" (mimeo, June 1977). 
4. Bailey, Martin N. and James Tobin, "Macroeconomic Effects of Selective Pub-
lic Employment and Wage Subsidies," The Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 1977:2. 
5. Boskin, Michael, "Social Security and Retirement Decisions," Economic In-
quiry, March 1977. 
6. Brechling, Frank, "The Incentive Effects of the U.S. Unemployment Insur-
ance Tax" in R. Ehrenberg, ed., Research in Labor Economics, I, 1977. 
7. Brechling, Frank, "Unemployment Insurance Taxes and Labor Turnover: 
Summary of Theoretical Findings," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July 
1977. 
8. Brechling, Frank and Christopher Jehns, "The Effects of the Unemployment 
Insurance Tax on Labor Turnover" (mimeo, January 1978). 
9. Brittain, John, "The Incidence of the Social Security Payroll Tax," American 
Economic Review, March 1971. 
10. Chiswick, Barry R. and Carmel U. Chiswick, "On Benefits of Mandatory 
Retirement," New York Times, November 12, 1977. 
11. Ehrenberg, Ronald, The Demand for State and Local Government Employees: An 
Economic Analysis (D.C. Heath, 1972). 
12. Ehrenberg, Ronald, "The Demand for State and Local Government Employ-
ment," American Economic Review, June 1973. 
13. Ehrenberg, Ronald, "Retirement System Characteristics and Compensating 
Differentials in the Public Sector" (mimeo, 1978). 
14. Ehrenberg, Ronald, Robert Hutchens and Robert G. Smith, "The Distribution 
of Unemployment Insurance Benefits and Costs (Final Report submitted to 
the U.S. Department of Labor, under Contract J-9-M-6-0098, March 1978). 
15. Feldstein, Martin, "Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capi-
tal Accumulation," Journal of Political Economy, September/October 1974. 
16. Feldstein, Martin, "Social Security and Private Savings: International Evi-
dence in an Extended Life Model" in Feldstein, ed., The Economics of Public 
Services, 1974. 
17. Feldstein, Martin, "Toward a Reform of Social Security," Public Interest, Sum-
mer 1975. 
18. Feldstein, Martin, "Social Security and Saving: The Extended Life Cycle 
Theory," American Economic Review, May 1976. 
19. Feldstein, Martin, "Facing the Social Security Crisis," Public Interest, Spring 
1977. 
20. Gould, John, Davis-Bacon Act: The Economics of Prevailing Wage Laws (Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, 1971). 
21. Gramlich, Edward, "Impact of Minimum Wages on Other Wages, Employ-
ment and Family Incomes," The Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1976:2. 
22. Gustman, Alan and Martin Segal, "Teachers' Pensions: An Analysis of Inter-
state Variations," Industrial Relations, November 1977. 
23. Hamermesh, Daniel, "New Estimates of the Incidence of the Payroll Tax" 
(mimeo, August 1977). 
24. Hamermesh, Daniel, "Effect of the UI System on Labor Force Behavior," 
Technical Analysis Paper, No. 54 (U.S. Department of Labor, September 1977). 
25. Hodgens, Evan, "Key Changes in Major Pension Plans," Monthly Labor 
Review, July 1975. 
26. Lazear, Edward, "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" (mimeo, Novem-
ber 1977). 
27. Medoff, James, "Layoffs and Alternatives Under Trade Unions in United 
States Manufacturing," American Economic Review (forthcoming). 
28. Munnell, Alicia, The Effect of Social Security on Personal Savings (Ballinger, 
1974). 
29. Munnell, Alicia, The Future of Social Security (Brookings Institution, 1976). 
30. Pencavel, John, "Some Labor Market Implications of the Payroll Tax For 
Unemployment and Old Age Insurance" (mimeo, 1974). 
31. Salisbury, Dallas, "The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Pri-
vate Pensions" (mimeo, 1977). 
32. Schulz, James, The Economics of Aging (Wadsworth, 1976). 
33. Slavick, Fred, Compulsory and Flexible Retirement in the American Economy 
(Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1966). 
34. U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Bulletin, 
February 1978, p. 1. 
35. Van de Water, Paul N., "Improving Work Incentives in the Social Security 
Disability Insurance Program" (mimeo, 1977). 
36. Vroman, Wayne, "Employer Payroll Tax Incidence; Empirical Tests With 
Cross-Country Data," Public Finance, 1974. 
141 
37. Vroman, Wayne, "Employer Payroll Taxes and Money Wage Behavior," Ap-
plied Economics, September 1974. 
38. U.S. Department of Labor, "Questions and Issues Relating to the Proposed 
Amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967" 
(mimeo, 1977). 
39. Weiss, Randall and Bradley Schiller, "The Value of Defined Benefit Pension 
Plans: A Test of the Equalizing Differences Hypothesis" (mimeo, 1976). 
APPENDIX TABLE 1 
Hypothetical Employer OASDHI Annual Payroll Tax Liability Per Employee-
Position (Assumed 3% Tax Rate, $800/month Earnings Level) 
Maximum 
Taxable 
Earnings (MTE) 
0 
$2400 
$4800 
$7200 
$9600 
Source: Author's 
MTE As A 
Fraction of 
Annual 
Earnings 
0 
.25 
.50 
.75 
1.00 
calculations. 
Annual 
OASDHI 
Tax/Position 
No Turnover 
$0 
$2400 
$4800 
$7200 
$9600 
Annual 
OASDHI 
Tax/Position 
Turnover 
$0 
$4800 
$9600 
$9600 
$9600 
Reduction in 
OASDHI 
Tax From 
Eliminating 
Turnover 
$0 
$2400 
$4800 
$2400 
$0 
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